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This research paper analyses the participation of members of the public (public participation)
1
 in the 
administration of justice, focusing on the problematic aspects of constitutional regulation. Constitutional amendments 
should establish a regulation that allows members of the public to participate in the administration of justice. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the fact that public participation is not established at the 
constitutional level in other European Union (hereinafter, the EU) countries violates the principles of separation of 
powers or constitutional rule of law. This paper also aims at discussing why the amendment to the Constitution is 
necessary for Lithuania, and what the scope of such an amendment should be so that the integrity of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter, the Constitution) is maintained, and the compliance with the requirements of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter, the Convention) is ensured. 
Design/methodology/approach. A qualitative research has been carried out. The following data collection 
methods were used: questionnaires made up of open-ended questions (the survey was conducted via email) as well as an 
interview (the interview with Prof. Egidijus Kūris via email), thematic analysis, and document selection. The following 
data processing methods were used: the data was processed by analysing the contents of the documents and 
summarising the educational (legal) practice. The following data analysis methods were used: a dogmatic and 
comparative analysis. The data regarding the level of regulation of public participation was collected remotely from the 
participants and experts (judges, representatives of courts, scholars, representatives of ministries of justice) from various 
EU countries. The data was collected, processed, and analysed from spring 2019 until the submission of this paper for 
publication, i.e. spring 2020. The participants of the study were asked problem questions related to constitutional 
regulation. Research papers, other literature related to the issue of the study, constitutions of EU countries, and other 
international and national legislation were analysed. The scope of the study is the legal framework of EU countries and 
selected from them the EU countries that have lay participation established only at the legislative (ordinary) level 
instead of the constitutional level. The data for the research was collected from Estonia, Malta, Finland, Sweden, 
Hungary, and Germany. In addition, Poland, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Norway were included in the study with 
regards to the amendment of Article 112(5) of the Constitution. The participants from Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and 
Norway agreed to participate in the study; however, they were unable to provide answers before submitting the paper 
for review. 
                                                 
1
 Two basic forms of lay participation in the administration of justice in contemporary legal systems may be 
distinguished (Pomorski, 1975, p. 198–209), i.e. the jury (court jurors), and lay judges (non-professional judges, lay 
participation, lay people, lay member, lay men (women). In the Lithuanian context, the term tarėjai is often used). 
These lay participants usually do not have legal training; the administration of justice is not a daily activity for them, 
and they do not make a living from it. The jury or court jurors means a group of individuals that have to make 
findings of fact. During a trial they decide on the truthfulness of the facts of the case and decide whether an individual 
is guilty while the judge decides on the applicable law, and if certain evidence should be presented to the jury. There 
are two types of juries: grand jury which decides whether an individual is guilty, and petit jury (trial jury) that hears 
trial cases (Callahan, 1997, p. 6). Lay judges usually have equal rights with the judge in that they adjudicate not only 
on questions of fact, but also questions of law. 
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The findings. For the EU countries that have lay participation established at the legislative (ordinary) instead of 
the highest (constitutional) level, it is not necessary to amend the Constitution. This is due to the differences among the 
countries, their systems and mentality, methods and tradition of constitutional interpretation and constitutional identity. 
However, within the context of the Lithuanian legal system, it is necessary to amend the Constitution. In order to 
maintain the integrity of the Constitution, and to harmonise constitutional regulation with the requirements of the 
Convention, four articles of the Constitution should be considered: amending Article 48(4) of the Constitution, 
supplementing Article 109 of the Constitution with Paragraph 5, supplementing Article 111 of the Constitution with 
Paragraph 5, and amending Article 112(5) of the Constitution. 
Research limitations/implications. Not all EU countries participated in the research, i.e. Ireland, Austria, 
Greece, Cypress, Luxembourg, and Portugal did not participate. Since not all the representatives expressed their consent 
to their opinions being published, in order to protect their personal data, the identities of such participants have not been 
presented in the paper. Only those who agreed to be quoted with their full name and place of work have been identified 
in the paper. 
Practical implications. Recommendations for further practice so that if the remaining countries decide to 
introduce public participation to the administration of justice, they can assess whether it is necessary to intervene in the 
constitution. Meanwhile, countries that have established public participation only at the legislative level may evaluate 
their constitutional identity with regards to the necessity to amend or supplement their constitutions. There are ongoing 
discussions in the EU countries about how to select lay judges so that their independence is ensured; therefore, this 
paper analyses whether lay judges should be introduced to the judiciary system in the same way as professional judges 
are. 
Originality/Value. There is a draft amendment to the Constitution registered at the Seimas of the Republic of 
Lithuania (hereinafter, the Seimas). The draft amendments to the Constitution No. XIIIP-3273 were considered in the 
Committee on Legal Affairs during the autumn session of the Seimas. However, the draft amendments received a lot of 
important observations, especially from scholars, due to which the consideration was postponed. It is currently unclear 
whether the authors of the draft amendments plan to clarify the document or not. This contributes to the relevance of the 
topic and the necessity to publicise the extent of the amendments to the Constitution. 
Keywords: lay judges, selection of lay judges, constitution, amendments to a constitution, constitutional 
amendments, the principle of separation of powers, the principle of constitutional rule of law, the principle of integrity. 
Research type: research paper. 





This paper analyses whether the participation of members of the public in the administration 
of justice should be embedded in the Constitution, and if so, to what extent. It is an important issue 
since in order to introduce lay judges to courts, a draft amendment to the Constitution has been 
registered at the Seimas (registration No. XIIIP-3273). The draft amendment is concerned with two 
articles of the Constitution. Article 48(4) of the Constitution is amended as follows: “˂…˃ citizens’ 
activity as a lay judge ˂…˃ shall not be considered forced labour” and Article 109 of the 
Constitution is supplemented with Paragraph 5: “In the cases established by law, citizens who have 
taken the oath of a lay judge consider cases and adopt decisions together with judges”. 
These amendments suggest following in the footsteps of continental law countries, as many 
EU countries have done, by introducing public participation to the administration of justice through 
lay judges instead of jurors: the rights of lay judges are equal to those of the judge, and lay judges 
decide not only on the questions of fact (much like jurors in common law systems) but also on the 
questions of law. They have voting rights, i.e. make decisions along with the judges. 
This paper consists of three parts. In the first part, the legislation of the EU countries that have 
public participation established at the legislative (ordinary) level and not the highest (constitutional) 
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level, i.e. Estonia, Malta, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, and Germany has been analysed. In the 
second part, the fact that the introduction of public participation in Lithuania would require a 
constitutional amendment that would state that courts are made up of lay judges as well, and that 
their involvement in dealing with cases is established by law. However, this would not only result 
in the amendment of Article 109 of the Constitution, but also in a supplement of Article 111 of the 
Constitution with Paragraph 5 which would state that the appointment and dismissal, legal status, 
and guarantees of independence of unprofessional judges are established by law. In the final, third 
part of this paper, the selection of citizens is discussed, including the need to amend the respective 
Article 112(5) of the Constitution, i.e. supplementing the statement that “A special institution of 
judges provided for by law shall advise the President of the Republic on the appointment, 
promotion, transfer of judges, or their dismissal from office” with that it also decides on the 
appointment and dismissal of lay judges or participates in the selection of lay judges. 
Before delving into the analysis, it is appropriate to summarise what we know about the 
research question for the readers. For this purpose, the essential research focused on this issue was 
reviewed (literature review). 
E. Kūris has severely criticised the circumvention of the Constitution in his paper stating: „It 
is of no importance whether the tarėjai
2
 are modelled after lay judges or the jury: it is impossible to 
introduce this concept without amending the Constitution“ (Kūris, 2012, p. 11). 
In a 2015 monograph titled “Tarėjų instituto perspektyvos Lietuvoje” [The Prospects of the 
Institution of Lay Judges in Lithuania] it is also noted that it is necessary to amend the Constitution 
(Ragauskas, et. al., 2015, p. 7). In order to help to decide on the concept of lay judges in Lithuania, 
the Law Institute of Lithuania carried out a survey, the results of which were presented in the above 
mentioned monograph. It is noted in the monograph that “the text of the Constitution mentions the 
judge as the sole actor of the court (and, in certain provisions, the term judge is used as a synonym 
of the court, as demonstrated, for example, by the comparison of Articles 109(1) and 109(2) as well 
as Articles 109(1) and 112(6) of the Constitution). The status of the judge, as defined in the text of 
the Constitution, has at least one limitation that is incompatible with the status of “a member of the 
public”, even if we call the latter “a judge from the public”: Article 113(1) of the Constitution states 
that “a judge may not hold any other elective or appointive office, may not work in any business, 
commercial, or other private establishments or enterprises. Also, he may not receive any 
remuneration other than the remuneration established for the justice and payment for educational or 
creative activities”. An individual who only works as a judge and receives remuneration solely for 
this activity cannot be considered an “unprofessional judge”. Therefore, in order to legalise the 
                                                 
2
 Lithuanian term for unprofessional (lay) judges. 
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institution of lay judges, it should at least be stated in the Constitution that the court is made up of 
lay judges in addition to professional judges”. 
In the most recent paper published in 2018, Darijus Beinoravičius, and Milda Vainiutė, 
analysed the necessity to amend the Constitution. Their opinion is that “the single most important 
issue regarding the establishment of the institution of lay judges is linked to Chapter IX of the 
Constitution, “The Court”, which establishes the framework and operating principles of courts in 
the Republic of Lithuania and lays down the mandatory provision that judges are appointed (Article 
112 of the Constitution) with the possibility of establishing specialised courts only. There is no 
mention of the concept of lay judges or the possibility of the introduction thereof. In order to 
establish this concept, the Constitution should undoubtedly be amended” (Beinoravičius and 
Vainiutė, 2018, p. 31). 
In scientific literature, Vytautas Sinkevičius was a prominent commentator on the topic of 
constitutional amendments (Sinkevičius, 2005; 2008; 2011; 2012; 2014; 2015; 2016). In 2013, 
Darius Butvilavičius, defended his dissertation titled “Konstitucijos pataisos” [Constitutional 
Amendments]. The most recent publication by the team of authors published in 2019, a monograph 
titled “Konstituciniai ginčai” [Constitutional Disputes], also includes a commentary about 
amendments to the Constitution. However, the authors of these works did not touch upon the 
concept of lay judges and the related constitutional amendments. 
In this paper, the analysis of the need to amend the Constitution with regards to the 
introduction of the concept of lay judges into the Lithuanian court system is continued. The Articles 
of the Constitution that should be amended or supplemented are hereby identified: Article 48(4) of 
the Constitution should be amended, Article 109 of the Constitution should be supplemented with 
Paragraph 5, Article 111 of the Constitution should be supplemented with Paragraph 5, and Article 
112(5) of the Constitution should be amended. EU countries (Estonia, Malta, Finland, Sweden, 
Hungary, and Germany) that have public participation established at the legislative (ordinary) level 
and not the highest (constitutional) level are also discussed in the paper, and the opinions of the 
representatives of these countries about why constitutional amendments are not necessary in this 
case are presented. 
 
1. Regulation of public participation in other EU countries 
 
Currently, members of the public (lay judges/jury) do not participate in the administration of 
justice in five out of twenty-seven EU countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands) while this institution exists in the remaining twenty-one, i.e. Greece, Portugal, France, 
Spain, Germany, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Italy, 
Malta, Ireland, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, and 
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Sweden). In Estonia, Malta, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, and Germany this concept is established 
not at the highest (constitutional), but the legislative (ordinary) level. This poses a question whether 
the fact that lay judges and juries are not established at the constitutional level violates constitutions 
and the principles of separation of powers and constitutional rule of law by entrusting people not 
explicitly specified in the constitution with the function of administration of justice. 
The principle of separation of powers can be divided into two closely interconnected parts: 
the first is the separation of powers, and the second is the interaction among the powers. The 
separation of powers is not only the division of powers into the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches but also the establishment of their formation procedure, legal status, powers, and 
competence as well as ensuring the independence thereof. The interaction among powers is the 
cooperation between authorities, coordination of actions, the functioning of the system of checks 
and balances which ensures that powers control and prevent each other and maintain their balance 
(Monkevičius, n.a.). The principle of constitutional rule of law means that a lower-ranking law 
cannot contradict a higher-ranking law: first and foremost, the Constitution (Sinkevičius, 2014, p. 
908). 
Further, let us examine Estonian lay judge legislation regulation. Thus, under the Estonian 
Constitution, only the courts administer justice. There is nothing about lay judges in the Estonian 
Constitution, but there is something in the court's act, and there is a little bit about the lay judges in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, there is a question whether such a regulation of lay judges is 
in conflict with the constitution? As Andreas Kangur states “According to Article 146 of the 
Constitution of Estonia, the power to administer justice is vested in courts, not judges
3
. What 
exactly the role of judges is, and who else may participate in the administration of justice in courts 
is set forth in statutes relating to the organization of courts and court procedures: there are, for 
example, judicial deputies who are entrusted with keeping the records of real property, wills, and 
corporate entities. Law clerks in our courts may issue orders under the judge’s name directing 
litigants to amend their deficient pleadings. So according to my reading, as long as the final word 
remains with a constitutionally appointed judge, there is no constitutional violation” (Dr. Andreas 
Kangur, lecturer of criminal Procedure University of Tartu School of Law). According to Maarja 
Torga “there is no conflict – Constitution says that “courts” administer justice (not “judges”). The 
court is composed of judges, who can be lay judges or “normal” judges” (Dr. Maarja Torga, judge, 
a visiting lecturer of private international law in the University of Tartu). 
                                                 
3
 “Justice is administered exclusively by the courts. The courts are independent in discharging their duties and 
administer justice in accordance with the Constitution and the laws”. 
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Now, let us explore the lay judge legislation in Finland. As Liisa Vanhala claims “there are 
no specific provisions of lay judges in the Constitution of Finland
4
, even though they assist the 
courts in the administration of justice by having voting rights (the majority of votes). Provisions 
that concern courts or the legal system more generally can be found in Sections 3, 21, 98–100, and 
103 in the constitution. The Constitutional Law Committee analysed lay judges in its 1996 report. 




” (Liisa Vanhala, Counsel to the 
Constitutional Law Committee). As can be seen, this document shows that the Constitutional Law 
Committee did not express its opinion on the institution of lay judges. According to other 
authorities “the Constitution of Finland contains provisions on the separation of powers (legislative 
powers, the governmental powers and the judicial powers), the structure of the courts of law and 
appointing the judges: according to Section 3(3) of the Constitution of Finland, the judicial powers 
are exercised by independent courts of law. According to Section 98 of the Constitution of Finland, 
the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal and the District Courts are the general courts of law. 
According to Section 102 of the Constitution of Finland, provisions on the appointment of judges 
are laid down by an act (meaning statutory level legislation). In Finland, these general provisions 
of the Constitution of Finland are considered sufficient to safeguard the independence of the courts 
and the members thereof; that is, professional judges and lay judges. There are no provisions on 
members of courts that are professional judges and lay judges in the Constitution of Finland. All 
provisions on courts and members of the courts are laid down in the Courts Act. According to 
Chapter 1 Section 3 of the Courts Act, the courts exercise the jurisdiction granted to them under the 
Constitution of Finland. The courts are independent in their exercise of jurisdiction. According to 
Chapter 1 Section 6 of the Courts Act, a judge (meaning both a professional judge and a lay judge) 
is independent in the administration of justice. The Courts Act has also provisions on members of 
the courts. For example, according to Chapter 2 Section 6 of the Courts Act, the members of a 
district court are the senior district court judge and the district court judges. In addition, a district 
court has lay judges as other members. These provisions in the Courts Act are not in conflict with 
the Constitution but instead they complement it” (Senior Specialist at/of Ministry of Justice, 
Department for Private Law and Administration of Justice, Court Affairs Unit). 
The following is the description of the legislation of lay judges in Germany. According to 
Jörg Müller “the Constitution of Germany does not address lay judges specifically and the fact that 
lay judges do decide in Germany – different to the Anglo-Saxon concept – not only on questions of 
                                                 
4
 The Constitution of Finland. https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf. 
5
 Perustuslakivaliokunnan mietintö 3/1996 vp (Valtioneuvoston oikeuskanslerin kertomus vuodelta 1994) PeVM 
3/1996 vp- K 8/1995 vp. https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Mietinto/Documents/pevm_3+1996.pdf. 
6
 Grundlagsutskottets betänkande 3/1996 rd (Justitiekanslerns i statsrådet berättelse för år 1994) GrUB 3/1996 rd -B 
8/1995 rd. https://www.eduskunta.fi/SV/vaski/Mietinto/Documents/grub_3+1996.pdf. 
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proof or sentencing but also on mere questions of law. However, it is the common understanding in 
my country that all judges – be it professional, lifetime, lay or judges for limited periods – shall be 
set independent by the constitution in their respective function as long as they carry it out. As I 
understand it, the constitution did not want to limit the scope of judges that could be established by 
law later on and focused just on the central requirement, that all judges have to be independent in 
carrying out this function. In Germany “judges” historically includes “lay judges”. Consequently, 
all the privileges and duties of professional judges also apply to lay judges without mentioning them 
expressly in the constitutional articles. Subsequently, Article 92 of the Constitution of Germany 
(GG) does empower parliament to adopt statutes regarding lay judges as well” (Jörg Müller, judge, 
The President of the Karlsruhe Regional Court). In the opinion of Speyer Martin “there is no 
regulation especially concerning lay judges in our constitution. But such a regulation is not needed. 
Article 101 of the GG rules that everyone has the right to a judgement by a judge assigned by law. 
In accordance with Section 44 of the German Judiciary Act
7
 (DRiG), any lay judge may act as a 
judge only on the basis of a law. Article 74 of the GG defines who (Federal Republic/States) is 
competent to legislate the Courts Constitution Act
8
. Section 28 of the Courts Constitution Act 
regulates courts with lay judges. The entire procedure to appoint lay judges is regulated by law. In 
accordance with Article 97 of the GG, every judge (professional judges as well as lay judges) is 
independent and only subject to the law. Article 44 of the DRiG lays down special rules for lay 
judges. Article of the 45 DRiG states explicitly that lay judges are as independent as professional 
judges” (Speyer Martin, judge). 
Emil Karlsson, Sweden, states that “according to Chapter 11 Section 2 of the Instrument of 
Government (which is a part of the Constitution of Sweden) provisions on the judicial tasks of the 
courts, on the main features of their organization and on the trial, in other respects than are 
concerned in the Instrument of Government, are given by law. Hence, provisions concerning the 
participation of lay judges are given by law, which is in line with the constitution” (Emil Karlsson, 
Deputy Director Division of Procedural Law and Court Issues Ministry of Justice). 
The Constitution of Lithuania, as well as the constitutions of Finland or Estonia, contains 





, and the appointment of judges
11
, which, as indicated above, in Finland are 
                                                 
7
 The German Judiciary Act in the version promulgated on April 19, 1972 (Federal Law Gazette l p. 713), as last 
amended by Article 9 of the Act of June 8, 2017 (Federal Law Gazette l p. 1570). http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_drig/englisch_drig.html#p0226. 
8
 The Courts Constitution Act. http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gvg/. 
9
 According to Paragraph 1 of Article 109 of the Constitution, justice in the Republic of Lithuania is administered only 
by courts. 
10
 According to Paragraph 1 of Article 111, the courts of the Republic of Lithuania are the Supreme Court of Lithuania, 
the Court of Appeal of Lithuania, and regional and district courts. 
Dementavičienė S., 2020, doi.org/10.33605/croma-022020-001 
 
 
Contemporary Research on Organization Management and Administration, Vol. 8 (2), 2020 
13 
considered to be sufficient by the courts and their members, i.e. professional judges and non-
professional (lay) judges, to protect their independence. A similar position is taken in Germany and 
Sweden. Therefore, it would be expedient to analyse whether such exclusively legal regulation 
would be sufficient for the introduction of public representatives in Lithuania in the next chapter. 
As stated by Tonio Borg from Malta “the Constitution of Malta, unlike the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter – the Convention), allows criminal proceedings to be 
decided only by a Court. No adjudicating authority may decide criminal cases. Consequent 
attempts at introducing lay judges to criminal proceedings have been declared unconstitutional 
(Police v. Emanuel Vella judgment of the Constitutional Court of 28
th
 June 1983). This rule has 
been extended to cover administrative penalties: if they are stiff and punitive, they cannot be 
applied by any organ or person other than a court presided over by a magistrate (inferior courts) 
or a judge (superior courts). We have had a trial by jury since the 1850’s. This system is not 
enshrined in the written Constitution but is contained in the Criminal Code which is an ordinary 
law. Technically it can be repealed at any time. Lay judges have been introduced to non-criminal 
cases through the setting up of the Small Claims Tribunal which covers civil cases under 15,000 
euros, presided over by a lawyer (not a judge or magistrate and in the establishment of 
administrative tribunals dealing with specific subjects in civil law e.g. lease law, industrial cases, 
unfair dismissal, agricultural leases, tax matters, etc.” (Prof. Tonio Borg, senior lecturer in public 
law at the University of Malta). 
The Hungarian authorities indicate that “the following main pieces of legislation contain 
detailed provisions on the Hungarian judicial system, its operation and the status of judges and 
judicial staff
12
.” (Head of Department/Associate Judge, Department of Judicial Relations, Ministry 
of Justice). According to Varga Zsolt András “the Fundamental Law of Hungary
13
 makes a small 
distinction between “judges” and “professional judges”, which is sufficient at the constitutional 
level: Article 26 of the Constitution of Hungary: (1) Judges shall be independent and responsible 
only to the law; they shall not be instructed in their activity of jurisdiction. Judges may only be 
removed from office on the grounds of and in accordance with the procedure specified by cardinal 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11
 Article 112 of the Constitution on the appointment of judges, which is regulated in detail in Chapter 7 of the Law on 
Courts. 
12
 The Fundamental Law of Hungary. (The current text of the Fundamental Law is available at the following website in 
Hungarian: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A1100425.ATV); Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organization and 
Administration of Courts (The current text of the Act is available at the following website in Hungarian: 
https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A1100161.TV); Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of 
Judges (The current text of the Act is available at the following website in Hungarian: 
https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A1100162.TV); Act LXVIII of 1997 on the Legal Status of Judicial Staff (The 
current text of the Act is available at the following website in Hungarian: 
https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99700068.TV). 
13
 Fundamental Law of Hungary (Magyarország Alaptörvénye) dated April 25, 2011 
https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A1100425.ATV. 
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statute. Judges may not be members of political parties and may not engage in political activities. 
Regulation 26(2) goes on to state that “professional judges shall be appointed by the President of 
the Republic in the manner specified by cardinal statute”. Those who have reached the age of thirty 
may be appointed as judges. Except for the President of the Curia and President of the National 
Office for the Judiciary the legal status of judges may last until the general retiring age” (Prof. Dr. 
Varga Zsolt András, Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Faculty of Law and Political Science, 
Department of Administrative Law). 
In summary of the above discussion in this chapter, the following position of expert Prof. E. 
Kūris, the participant of this study, can be quoted: “Countries are different: their systems, 
mentalities, methods, and traditions of interpreting the constitution also differ, among other 
things”. Due to this, it is impossible to conclude that not establishing the institution of lay judges or 
jurors at the constitutional level violates the principles of separation of power and rule of law or the 
constitution itself, since people not explicitly specified in the constitution are entrusted with 
administering justice. In addition to this, “every country has its own constitutional identity” (Kūris, 
2019, p. 157). Also, this may be supplemented by the opinion of Aharon Barak, who states that 
“democratic countries differ from one another, and what is good and proper for one may not be 
good and proper for another” (Barak, 2006, p. 14). A. Barak has also accurately pointed out that 
“comparative law is not just about comparing laws. Comparative interpretation can take place only 
among legal systems that share a common ideological basis” (Barak, 2005, p. 170). 
Having discussed the attitude of the representatives of the states whose lay judges are only 
established at the statutory level regarding the constitutionality of such regulation, we have to 
further review the situation in Lithuania. Can lay judges arise in the Lithuanian justice system 
without the intervention in the Constitution? 
 
2. Research methodology 
 
Qualitative research has been carried out. The following data collection, data processing, and 
data analysis methods have been employed: 
1. Data collection methods. The questionnaires made up of open-ended questions were 
developed (the survey was conducted via email). The data regarding the level of regulation of 
public participation was collected remotely from the participants from various EU countries 
(judges, representatives of courts, scholars, representatives of ministries of justice)
14
. Also, an 
interview with the expert (the interview with Prof. E. Kūris, former President of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania, current judge of the European Court of Human Rights, via 
email) was carried out. Finally, also thematic analysis, and document selection were performed. The 
                                                 
14
 This question is discussed in more detail in the first chapter of this paper. 
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participants of the study and the expert were asked problem questions related to constitutional 
regulation. 
2. Data processing methods. The data, obtained from the questionnaires and the interview, 
was processed by analysing and comparing it with the contents of the documents, i.e. research 
papers, other literature related to the issue of the study, constitutions of EU countries, and other 
international and national legislation, and by summarising the educational (legal) practice under the 
supervision of Prof. V. Sinkevičius via email. 
3. Data analysis methods. A dogmatic and comparative analysis was performed. 
The data from the questionnaires were collected, processed, and analysed from spring 2019 
until the submission of this paper for publication, i.e. spring 2020. The interview was carried out via 
email: the questions were sent on February 5
th




The scope of the study is the legal framework of EU countries
15
, and the selected from them 
EU countries that have lay participation established only at the legislative (ordinary) level instead of 
the constitutional level, i.e. Estonia, Malta, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, and Germany. As can be 
seen, not all states in the EU have lay judges at the constitutional level. Thus, Lithuania might also 
not need the intervention in the Constitution in order to introduce lay judges?
16
 
In addition, Poland, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Norway were included in the study with 
regards to the amendment of Article 112(5) of the Constitution. The participants from Latvia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, and Norway agreed to participate in the study but were unable to provide 




3. The necessity of the amendments to the Constitution of Lithuania in order to 
introduce lay judges 
 
Undoubtedly, the stability of a constitution does not deny the dynamic nature of regulation. It 
is best to combine the stability of a constitution with the dynamic nature of the constitutional 
system. The latter may sometimes be ensured by developing the constitutional rules and principles 
in the jurisprudence of the constitutional court as well as amendments to the constitution (but only 
in cases where such correction is certainly necessary). In terms of the general goals of constitutional 
amendments, there are two types of constitutional amendments: the first type fills textual gaps and 
corrects technical flaws, while the second type marks significant changes occurring in the political 
system (Jarašiūnas, 2009). According to D. Butvilavičius globalisation, religious fundamentalism, 
                                                 
15
 Not all the EU countries participated in the research, i.e. Ireland, Austria, Greece, Cypress, Luxembourg, and 
Portugal did not participate, as they just did not respond to the requests sent by email. 
16
 This question is discussed in more detail in the third chapter of this paper. 
17
 This question is discussed in more detail in the fourth chapter of this paper. 
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terrorist threat, demographic changes and migration, political processes taking place in a country, 
emerging constitutional flaws, increasing gap between the material and formal constitutions and, 
undoubtedly, various demands of the civil society may influence the decision to amend the 
constitution (Butvilavičius, 2013, p. 5). In the case analysed in this paper, i.e. the second type as 
defined by Egidijus Jarašiūnas and D. Butvilavičius, there is a political will in Lithuania to 
introduce the members of the public to the judicial system, thus deprofessionalising it. 
Article 109(1) of the Constitution states that “in the Republic of Lithuania, justice shall be 
administered only by courts”, the same as Article 146 of the Constitution of Estonia (“Justice shall 
be administered solely by the courts”). As mentioned in the first chapter of this paper, the 
participant of the study (expert) Prof. E. Kūris believes, “that the interpretation of the Estonian 
Constitution (as mentioned in the first chapter of this paper) is not suitable for Lithuania (or not 
suitable anymore), because the constitutional definition of a judge cannot be interpreted as if it 
encompasses lay judges or, especially, jurors: the Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that 
the judicial power is formed on a professional basis”. The interpretation of the interpreter (i.e. the 
Constitutional Court) of the Constitution that the judicial power is formed on a professional basis is 
provided in rulings of the Constitutional Court dated 21 December 1999, 12 July 2001, 31 March 
2004 (Kūris, 2006, p. 9). It should also be kept in mind that the principal differences that mark the 
boundaries of the partnership between the judicial power and other powers: the courts have the 
exclusive competence to administer justice; justice must be administered in accordance with the 
law; therefore, the judicial power is formed on a professional instead of political basis. This 
determines its special place in the government system and the special status of judges (ruling of the 
Constitutional Court dated 21 December 1999, decision dated 12 January 2000, ruling dated 12 July 
2001, conclusion dated 21 March 2004, rulings dated 13 May 2004, 16 January 2006, 28 March 
2006, 9 May 2006, decision dated 8 August 2006, rulings dated 27 November 2006, 22 October 
2007, 20 February 2008, 29 June 2010, 14 February 2011, 7 April 2011) (Kūris, 2011, p. 41). Due 
to the fact that judicial power is formed on a professional basis, the approach of the other countries 
mentioned above would not be suitable for Lithuania. In the introduction of this paper, other 
opinions of scholars regarding the necessity to amend the Constitution of Lithuania in order to 
introduce the concept of lay judges were discussed. Therefore, assuming that the constitutional 
amendment should be adopted, it is not analysed further. 
However, a situation that has not been discovered in scientific literature should be discussed 
as it may pose the question of whether the amendment is actually necessary. How much does the 
fact that the constitutionality of lay judges was not disputed from 1990 to 1995, when lay judges 
were in the composition of Lithuanian courts, affect the inevitability of constitutional amendments? 
Laws and parts thereof are considered to be legal and compliant with the Constitution until they are 
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declared to be in conflict with the Constitution. Participant of the study (expert) Prof. E. Kūris says 
“that the fact that the constitutionality of lay judges was not disputed then does not prove anything: 
inertia was at play, so no one disputed it even though it was possible. There were no transitional 
provisions and it was a serious flaw of the Constitution. Once the Constitution came into force, in 
the formal sense, many things that worked were unconstitutional (but were never declared as such). 
For example, the two-tier ordinary court system: the Constitution explicitly establishes a four-tier 
system. The Constitution was developed under the condition of time trouble; otherwise, it might 
have included other provisions that would have established time limits for reforming the judicial 
system and other institutions or procedures. However, reforming the judicial system according to 
the constitutional requirements took time. The same can be said about the institution of the 
parliamentary ombudsman or the Commander of the Armed Forces, etc. There was real haste to 
establish the Constitutional Court because the presidential election was scheduled, and the oath of 
the President could only be taken by the President of the Constitutional Court”. 
Having discussed that the amendment of the Constitution is inevitable in the Lithuanian 
context, further the extent of its amendment is discussed. 
There is a draft amendment to Article 48(4) of the Constitution registered at the Seimas. The 
draft amendment states that “˂…˃ citizens’ activity as a lay judge ˂…˃ shall not be considered 
forced labour”. As mentioned in a discussion with Prof. V. Sinkevičius, “Article 48 of the 
Constitution may pose problems when it comes to implementing it: for example, can a lay judge that 
has been fined for failure to appear at a court hearing administer justice?” Although Article 48 of 
the Constitution may be problematic merely because of its implementation, this amendment is 
necessary and, thus, not analysed further in this paper. 
As mentioned above, there is a draft amendment to Article 109 of the Constitution, which 
would supplement it with Paragraph 5, registered at the Seimas. The paragraph states that “in the 
cases established by law, citizens who have taken the oath of a lay judge consider cases and adopt 
decisions together with judges”. Once this amendment is passed, lay judges selected from members 




The amendment of the Constitution by introducing lay judges poses the question whether 
such members of the public should have the same rights and duties as professional judges do 
establish at the constitutional level: restrictions on employment and political activities (Article 113); 
prohibition to interfere with the activities of a lay judge and guarantee of legal immunity against 
criminal prosecution (Article 114); grounds for the dismissal of a lay judge (Article 115). 
                                                 
18
 As mentioned in this chapter of this paper the amendment of the Constitution is inevitable in the Lithuanian context 
because the judicial power is formed on a professional basis. 
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Establishing these rights and duties at the legislative level would not ensure equal status because it 
would allow establishing different rights and duties for lay judges, thus violating the principle of the 
equal legal status of judges developed by the Constitutional Court (rulings of the Constitutional 
Court dated 9 May 2006, 22 October 2007, 14 February 2011). The equal legal status of judges 
when administering justice is an important element of the constitutional principle of judicial 
independence (ruling of the Constitutional Court dated 14 February 2011). Participant of the study 
(expert) Prof. E. Kūris believes “it is not necessary because it would be sufficient to supplement the 
Constitution with a provision that the appointment, dismissal, status, and guarantees of 
independence of lay judges are established by law (similarly as Article 125(2) does with regards to 
the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania)”. In a discussion Prof. V. Sinkevičius, said 
“that the status of lay judges should be determined not only by the Constitution, but also by law; in 
addition to this, there is Article 111(4) of the Constitution
19
. Therefore, the Law on Courts should be 
supplemented with the relevant provisions”. This legal analysis leads us to the conclusion that it is 
not only necessary to amend Article 48(4) and supplement Article 109 of the Constitution with 
Paragraph 5, but also to supplement Article 111 of the Constitution with Paragraph 5: “the 
appointment and dismissal, legal status and guarantees of independence of unprofessional judges 
are established by law”. 
D. Beinoravičius and M. Vainiutė discuss the idea of introducing the institution of lay judges 
gradually; in this scenario lay judges would not receive remuneration and any member of the public 
could become a lay judge. Such a lay judge would have the procedural right to ask and receive 
reasoned explanations, appeal insufficient explanations, question the validity and clarity of such 
explanations, and so on. This conceptual model would not intervene in the Constitution and the 
legal system but would instead supplement the practice and support the constitutional goal to 
strengthen the relationship between authorities and the public. It would be appropriate to develop a 
model based on this goal (Beinoravičius and Vainiutė, 2018, p. 31). Prof. E. Kūris, a participant of 
the study (expert), “agrees with the introduction of this model, noting that at first, a gradual 
introduction of the institution of lay judges (based on a general constitutional amendment) should 
be considered for very limited categories of cases, the list of which could later be expanded. The 
Concept of Lay Judges
20
 lists these categories of cases in an overly-detailed manner”. A gradual 
introduction of the institution of lay judges seems to be the most appropriate – of course, this only 
applies to courts of the first instance, as discussed in a paper (Vėgėlė and Kazakevičiūtė, 2017, 
                                                 
19
 Article 111(4) of the Constitution states that the formation and competence of courts shall be established by the Law 
on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania. 
20
 Approved by Resolution by the Seimas dated 11 October 2016 No. XII-2676. 
(Lithuanian: “Visuomeninių teisėjų (tarėjų) instituto teismuose koncepcija”). https://e-
seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/48f22ce3912f11e68adcda1bb2f432d1?jfwid=1m73rttka. 
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256–270) focused on the influence of the institution of lay judges on case law and whether this 
institution is compatible with the principle of legal certainty. If such regulation succeeds, the list of 
categories of cases that members of the public adjudicate may be expanded as necessary. Such 
gradual inclusion of members of the public in the administration of justice would ensure that the 
state can bear the financial burden. There would also be no significant intervention in the 
functioning of the judiciary, so if the selection mechanism fails or malfunctions, the administration 
of justice is disturbed as little as possible. If public participation in the administration of justice 
succeeds in the practical sense, another model that is the most appropriate for Lithuania could be 
introduced, after analysing the practice and regulation of other EU countries. 
Especially, since in order to ensure proper exercise of the functions of members of the public, 
the financial aspect is also important: failure to grant funds for the establishment of this institution 
would make it impossible to implement it, and would violate the Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court noted in its ruling dated 13 December 2004 that before legislating, the legislator must allocate 
funds necessary to implement such a law, i.e. according to the Constitution, the legislator shall not 
create a legal situation where a law or another legal act that requires funds is made but the necessary 
funds are not allocated or an insufficient amount is allocated. The significant financial burden of the 
lay judge's institute is illustrated by the example of Finland. “Nowadays, in the district courts of 
Finland, all civil cases and most criminal cases are decided by professional judges. In 2018, only 
about 3 600,00 cases out of the total of 56 000,00 criminal cases were decided with a professional 
judge and lay judges. In 2018, there were about 1 470,00 lay judges in the 20 district courts. This 
means each lay judge participated in the decision making of only 2–3 cases. The hearing fees and 
the reimbursement for possible loss of income paid to the lay judges are about 1 300 000,00 euros 
per year. In addition, administrative work in the courts and the Finnish Government Shared 
Services Centre for Finance and HR costs a few hundred thousand euro per year. The total cost of 
the lay judge system is about 1,5 million euro per year” (Senior Specialist, Ministry of Justice, 
Department for Private Law and Administration of Justice, Court Affairs Unit). It should also be 
noted that members of the public should have separate chambers where they could wait for hearings 
to start which would allow administering justice properly and efficiently. In this case, real funding 
must be provided so as not to violate the Constitution. 
Therefore, in order to introduce the institution of lay judges to Lithuania, first of all, the 
moderate (gradual) model should be applied. Once it succeeds and, having analysed the practice of 
other EU countries, the most appropriate (optimal) model for Lithuania is discovered, not only the 
matter of amending Article 48(4) of the Constitution and supplementing Article 109 with Paragraph 
5, but also the matter of supplementing Article 111 of the Constitution with Paragraph 5 (that the 
appointment and dismissal, legal status and guarantees of independence of unprofessional judges 
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are established by law) should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. If a constitutional 
amendment is, in fact, necessary and if it does not violate the consistency of constitutional 
regulation, the amendment should be adopted in a timely (Butvilavičius, 2013, p. 52) and 
comprehensive manner so that the principle of the integrity of the Constitution (analysed in the next 
chapter) is maintained. 
 
4. The selection of lay judges and the need to amend Article 112(5) of the Constitution 
 
This chapter is focused on the selection of lay judges and the related issue of the amendment 
to Article 112(5) of the Constitution. The issue of selection, i.e. who should be entrusted with 
appointing and dismissing lay judges is important from the independence point-of-view. In order to 
protect lay judges from external influence, the same independence and depoliticising should also 
apply. It must be ensured that lay judges are not appointed in order to influence their decisions. 
However, in the legal doctrine, the importance of the procedure for the appointment of judges for 
judicial independence is also emphasised (Schabas, 2017, p. 294). 
The Constitutional Court of Latvia in its ruling dated 1 April 2004 (point 10)
21
 ruled “that 
under rule of law, the principle of separation of powers especially protects the judicial 
independence from the intervention of the executive. Entrusting the minister of justice with the 
selection and appointment of lay judges may raise suspicions regarding the independence of such a 
candidate from the executive power, resulting in doubts surrounding the impartiality of decisions 
made by such a lay judge. Therefore, a procedure under which the minister of justice appoints lay 
judges is in conflict with both the constitution and the definition of an independent court laid down 
in Article 6 of the Convention”. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
– the ECHR) it is noted that even though the Convention does not mention the principle of the 
separation of powers, the significance of this principle on judicial independence is emphasised
22
. It 




In addition to this, courts that consist mostly of lay judges who are also party members can 
easily become a political institution the decisions of which are influenced not only by the executive 
but also by the legislative power. According to the example of Finland, “the Ministry of Justice 
confirms the total number of lay judges in the district courts. The municipal councils appoint the lay 
judges for a term of four years. The courts are independent in exercising their judicial powers. 
                                                 
21
 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia, 1 April 2004, ruling. https://likumi.lv/ta/id/96115-par-likuma-par-
tiesu-varu-75-panta-ietvertas-normas-vardu-vai-tiesas-piesedetajam-atbilstibu-latvijas-republikas-satversmes-84-. 
22
 Kleyn and others v. the Netherlands, no. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99), § 193, ECHR, 2003-III. 
23
 Brudnicka and others v. Poland, no. 54723/00, § 41, ECHR, 2005-III. 
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From this point of view, Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland
24
 and The Council of Europe’s anti-
corruption group
25
 have repeatedly pointed out that lay judges being appointed by the municipal 
councils which are political bodies is problematic. The courts should both be and seem independent 
and impartial in their decision-making and they may not seem so when a political body appoints 
some members of the courts” (Senior Specialist Ministry of Justice, Department for Private Law and 
Administration of Justice, Court Affairs Unit). Thus, the selection of lay judges is also criticised in 
Finland, because some of the candidates are party members which is incompatible with the 
requirement of independence of lay judges. 
Article 114(1) of the Constitution of Lithuania states that „interference by institutions of State 
power and governance, Members of the Seimas and other officials, political parties, political and 
public organisations, or citizens with the activities of a judge or the court shall be prohibited and 
shall incur liability provided for by law”. Thus, entrusting municipal councils or ministries of 
justice with the procedure of selecting members of the public would violate this constitutional rule 
because there may be doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of members of the public 
selected in such a way. For example, when a case brought before a mixed panel (when lay judges 
have voting rights) the legality of acts and actions made by municipal administration bodies or 
compensation for damages caused by unlawful acts of authorities when the state is represented by 
the Ministry of Justice. 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has also presented an exceptionally 
broad analysis of judicial impartiality and independence as an element of the administration of 
justice (rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania dated 21 December 1999 
and 27 November 2006) (Dereškevičiūtė, 2013, p. 120). 
Consider the example of Poland when in its ruling dated 9 November 2005 in the judgment 
119/10/A/2005 the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland decided on the necessity for the National 
Judicial Council (Polish: Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa) to defend judicial independence not only by 
forming the composition of professional judges but also by participating in selecting lay judges 
(Polish: Ławnicy). The question of whether the legislator should establish the procedure of selecting 
lay judges, analogous to the appointment of judges, was raised. In discussing this ruling of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland Piotr Czerkawski said that “the Constitutional Tribunal indicated 
(point 5.4.) that the current procedure is better (in theory and practice) than one that would be 
similar to the choice of judges. The point is that through lay judges, various groups of citizens 
become involved in the judiciary. They are to provide a social point of view and protect the Court 
against isolation and alienation. They are to ensure the courts’ contact with the public. They are to 
                                                 
24
 Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland. https://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/en/web/guest. 
25
 The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco. 
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be a “counterweight” to the professional factor (judges). The National Council of the Judiciary is a 
representation of the judicial community. It’s the selection of lay judges could blur this division into 
social and professional factors. Lay judges participation in are a social factor, so they should be 
chosen by representatives of the society (municipal councils) and not representatives of the 
judiciary. If that were the case, lay judges would lose their position as a social factor. This would 
limit the opportunities for citizens to participate in justice. In addition, it would not be possible due 
to the number of lay judges (tens of thousands practically one time)” (Piotr Czerkawski, Judge of 
Regional court in Plock (Poland), Labour Law and Social Security Division). Therefore, the 
selection mechanism thereof does not have to be identical and the authority that appoints lay judges 
is not necessary; the most important thing is ensuring the independence of lay judges. Statutory 
provisions allowing judicial authorities (presidents of courts) to reject lay judges that fail to comply 
with statutory criteria (by suspending or dismissing such persons) to participate in the judicial 
system have been recognised as more functional. 
The National Council of the Judiciary in Poland is a constitutional institution as well as in 
Lithuania. It suggests candidate judges to the President by proposing a motion (Article 179 of the 
Constitution). Such regulation is also established in the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary 
(Article 3(1)(2) of Chapter 2 “Competencies and structure of the Council”). According to Piotr 
Czerkawski “Under Polish law, the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland chooses one candidate and 
proposes him to the President. This is obligatory. The President cannot appoint a judge who was 
not nominated earlier by the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. But the President can refuse to 
appoint the candidate who was nominated by the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland without 
justification (if the President refuses the candidates, he does not have to explain the refusal). This 
situation occurs rarely and is very controversial. Lay judges in the ordinary court are chosen by the 
commune’s council. The Constitutional Tribunal of Poland and the President do not play a role in 
the election of lay judges. The same in the Supreme Court, the lay judges are elected by the Senate 
to the Supreme Court” (Piotr Czerkawski, Judge of Regional court in Plock (Poland), Labour Law 
and Social Security Division). 
As can be seen, Act of Law on the organisation of common courts states the following: “The 
Minister of Justice, after consulting the National Council of the Judiciary, specifies, by regulation, 
the procedure for processing documents filed with councils of communes when submitting 
proposals concerning candidates for lay judges, the sample proposal form and the way of making 
the form available” (Article 162(11)). According to Piotr Czerkawski “Such a regulation is issued 
after consulting the National Council of the Judiciary. This means that the Minister of Justice is 
obliged to send a draft regulation to the National Council of the Judiciary. The National Council of 
the Judiciary should issue an opinion on this project, but the opinion is not binding. Even if it is 
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negative, the Minister of Justice may still issue a regulation with the content he wants. His 
obligation applies only to send for the purpose of issuing an opinion and waiting for it and to get 
acquainted and that is all. There is no requirement for permission. If compliance is required, the 
provisions use the words “after consent” or “with consent”. The phrase: “after consulting” means 
only the need to get acquainted with the position of another body but without the obligation to take 
his opinion into account. It can be said that this is only a form of discussion. The National Court 
Register cannot force the Minister of Justice to take his position into account, it can only suggest” 
(Piotr Czerkawski, Judge of Regional court in Plock (Poland), Labour Law and Social Security 
Division). Thus, the opinion of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland in the selection of 
lay judges is not binding; also, like the National Court Register of Poland, the Minister of Justice is 
free to choose the nomination of lay judges. 
In the opinion of the author of this article, the involvement of an independent body in the 
selection of lay judges is necessary (by eliminating ministers of justice or municipal councils from 
their selection). This body should not participate in the selection of lay judges by an advisory vote 
(“proposal” is not binding), but its position should influence the entry of lay judges into the judicial 
system (“submission”). The reasons for this are discussed below. 
The Consultative Council of European Judges (the CCJE) (hereafter referred to as “the 
Consultative Board”) adopted the Grand Charter of Judges, which contains fundamental principles 
relating to judges and the judicial system, the Article 4 which states that “judicial independence 
shall be guaranteed in respect of judicial activities and in particular in respect of recruitment, 
nomination until the age of retirement, promotions, irremovability, training, judicial immunity, 
discipline, remuneration, and financing of the judiciary”. In this sense, the rules on the appointment 
of judges are viewed positively, because Article 112(5) of the Constitution of Lithuania states that a 
special institution of judges provided for by law shall advise the President of the Republic on the 
appointment, promotion, transfer of judges, or their dismissal from office. In the Law on Courts of 
Lithuania, this authority is titled the Judicial Council and, in accordance with Article 119 of the 
Law on Courts, is defined as “an executive body of the self-governance of courts ensuring the 
independence of courts and judges”. In Lithuania, Article 112(4) of the Constitution states that 
judges of courts of the first instance (district and regional courts) are appointed exclusively by the 
President of the Republic of Lithuania who is, as mentioned above, advised by the Judicial Council 
(Article 112(5) of the Constitution). 
In one of his papers V. Sinkevičius noted that terms “proposal” and “submission” are not 
identical: “proposal” is not binding (i.e. it does not result in any legal consequences) while 
“submission” is the opposite and without it, the President of the Republic of Lithuania is unable to 
exercise his or her constitutional right to appoint and dismiss judges (Sinkevičius, 2016, p. 29). 
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Therefore, in this case, the advice has legal power: if the President of the Republic of Lithuania 
does not receive approval from this authority, he or she cannot appoint someone as a judge (or 
dismiss such an individual, etc.) (rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 
dated 21 December 1999, 9 May 2006, 20 December 2007). As can be seen, it is different from the 
case of Poland, when the President can refuse to appoint the candidate who was nominated by the 
National Council of the Judiciary of Poland without justification (if the President refuses the 
candidates, he does not have to explain the refusal). 
The Judicial Council has stated its position on the selection of lay judges in its remarks 
submitted to the Government with regards to the draft Law on Lay Judges
26
. The Judicial Council 
proposes to assign functions important for the formation of the body of lay judges to the Council 
itself. For example, the Judicial Council should be entrusted with the right to include and remove an 
individual from the list of lay judges, otherwise, there is a risk of violating Article 6 of the 
Convention. If such a proposal were implemented, the Judicial Council would not only have the 
opportunity to assess every individual seeking to administer justice along with the judges but also 
would have the competence to approve the regulations of forming and managing the list of lay 
judges, to appoint members to the Lay Judge Candidate Selection Committee (hereinafter: the 
Selection Committee) and to approve the procedures thereof. The Government is suggesting to take 
into consideration some of the remarks (i.e. remarks related to the decision to include an individual 
into the list of lay judges, forming and managing this list and approving the composition of the 
Selection Committee)
27
. The Seimas has not yet presented its opinion (see Abstract “Originality / 
Value”). As regards the selection method, the Judicial Council has chosen the method of appointing 
based on selection instead of random selection (Jackson and Kovalev, 2006, p. 99–100). In the first 
stage, the individuals are appointed by certain entities (in this case, by the Judicial Council and, 
unlike in many countries, not by the minister of justice or municipalities) or express their wish to 
represent the public themselves. In the second stage, the list of candidates is approved, in this case, 
by the Judicial Council (and, unlike in many countries, not by the minister of justice or 
municipalities). It is the opinion of the Judicial Council that in terms of their constitutional status, 
                                                 
26
 Teisėjų tarybos 2019 m. lapkričio 18 d. atsakymas į Lietuvos Respublikos Teisingumo ministerijos 2019 m. spalio 31 




 Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės 2019 m. gruodžio 18 d. nutarimas Nr. 1348 „Dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Tarėjų 
įstatymo projekto Nr. XIIIP-3891, Lietuvos Respublikos civilinio proceso kodekso 62 straipsnio pakeitimo ir kodekso 
papildymo XIV skyriaus pirmuoju
1 
skirsniu įstatymo projekto Nr. XIIIP-3892, Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamojo 
proceso kodekso 40 straipsnio pakeitimo ir kodekso papildymo XVIII
1 
skyriumi įstatymo projekto Nr. XIIIP-3893, 
Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamojo kodekso 230 ir 231 straipsnių pakeitimo įstatymo projekto Nr. XIIIP-3894 ir 
Lietuvos Respublikos administracinių nusižengimų kodekso papildymo 226
2
 straipsniu ir 589 straipsnio pakeitimo 
įstatymo projekto Nr. XIIIP-3895“. https://e-
seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/00e677612d3211ea8f0dfdc2b5879561?positionInSearchResults=0&searchModel
UUID=6cfb759f-0e62-42ca-b962-089061e4fbe9. 
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lay judges should be as close as possible to a judge. This is an acceptable position since one of the 
aspects of judicial independence is the fact that all judges have the same legal status when 
administering justice (ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania dated 14 
February 2011). 
This position arises from Article 6 of the Convention that states that only a court that is 
independent of other authorities and also of the parties can be considered independent
28
. Modern 
international independence standards for courts and judges are discussed in Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, 
efficiency and responsibilities (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010 at the 
1098th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) (hereinafter: the Recommendations)
29
, where it is noted 
that the independence of the judiciary secures for every person the right to a fair trial and, therefore, 
is not a privilege for judges, but a guarantee of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
allowing every person to have confidence in the justice system. The aforementioned ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of Latvia states that a procedure under which the minister of justice appoints 
lay judges is in conflict with both the constitution and the definition of an independent court laid 
down in Article 6 of the Convention. 
In its ruling dated 5 September 2012, the Constitutional Court of Lithuania emphasised that a 
judgment of the ECHR cannot by itself be the constitutional basis for reinterpreting (correcting) the 
official constitutional doctrine; the principle of the primacy of the Constitution suggests that the 
only way to eliminate the incompatibility between the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Convention is to pass the respective amendments to the Constitution (Konstituciniai ginčai, 2019, p. 
154). In its ruling dated 14 March 2006, the Constitutional Court of Lithuania noted that respect for 
international law, complying with international commitments, respect for the accepted principles of 
international law (including the pacta sunt servanda principle) is the tradition and constitutional 
principle of restored independent Lithuania. Also, Article 135(1) of the Constitution states that the 
Republic of Lithuania shall follow the universally recognised principles and norms of international 
law. Article 135(1) imposes the duty to eliminate the incompatibility of the Constitution and the 
Convention. Having considered the fact that the Lithuanian legal system is based on the principle of 
the primacy of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court determined that the only way to eliminate 
this incompatibility is to pass the respective amendments to the Constitution (Konstituciniai ginčai, 
2019, p. 370–371). 
                                                 
28
 Beaumartin v. France, no. 15287/89, § 38, ECHR, 1994-XI. 
29
 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, 
efficiency, and responsibilities (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010 at the 1098th meeting 
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Lithuania should harmonise its constitutional and statutory regulation with the requirements 
of the Convention, as imposed by Article 46(1) of the Convention, according to which the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they 
are parties. When introducing lay judges, constitutional regulation should be amended in a way that 
complies with the provisions of the Convention regarding the definition of an independent court 
and, on the basis of the new constitutional regulation, statutory regulation should be developed or 
amended, thus avoiding judgments of the ECHR concerned with the violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
In the discussion with the author of the article about the issue, prof. V. Sinkevičius raises the 
following question: “is it enough to specify in Article 109(1) of the Constitution that there are also 
lay judges in the courts and that their participation in the adjudication of cases is determined by 
law? Should Article 112(5) (“A special institution of judges provided for by law shall advise the 
President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, transfer of judges, or their dismissal from 
office”), which establishes an independent judiciary to advice on judge’s appointment or dismissal, 
etc. be amended as well? In other words, can lay judges, if they have the power of the decisive vote, 
emerge in a different way than conventional judges? If an amendment to the Constitution was made 
and it was established that they could enter the system in a different way (without the independent 
advice of the special institution of judges (The Judicial Council), provided in Article 112(5)), would 
such an amendment be compatible with the Constitution and its principle of integrity?” 
The principle of legal certainty laid down in Article 6(1) of the Constitution, i.e. the provision 
that “the Constitution shall be an integral <…> act”, poses the imperative that constitutional 
amendments cannot violate the consistency of constitutional provisions and values set out thereof. 
Provisions of the Constitution and the implementation (application) thereof cannot be interpreted in 
a way that makes that constitutional provision fictitious or in a way that goes against the purpose 
and nature of that constitutional provision (Sinkevičius, 2015, p. 219). Article 109(1) of the 
Constitution states that justice shall be administered only by courts. It is a constitutional value that 
cannot be contradicted by amendments to the Constitution (Sinkevičius, 2015, p. 219). There is an 
amendment to the Constitution that supplements Article 109 of the Constitution with Paragraph 5 
registered at the Seimas, stating that “in the cases established by law, citizens who have taken the 
oath of a lay judge consider cases and adopt decisions together with judges”. Article 109(2) of the 
Constitution states that while administering justice, the judge and courts shall be independent. This 
independence is guaranteed by an independent institution of judges – the Judicial Council – 
established by Article 112(5) of the Constitution. Therefore, Article 112(5) should be amended so 
that lay judges could only enter the judicial system via the independent institution of judges. One of 
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the main requirements for judicial independence is the appointment procedure for judges
30
. It is 
especially notable that since Article 109(4) of the Constitution states that the court shall adopt 
decisions in the name of the Republic of Lithuania, it means that by having voting rights, lay judges 
will do the same. Article 109(3) of the Constitution states that when considering cases, judges shall 
obey only the law; therefore, much like professional judges, lay judges should also obey the 
Constitution and the laws only. In its ruling dated 24 January 2014 the Constitutional Court ruled 
that constitutional amendments cannot violate the consistency of constitutional provisions and 
values set out thereof because it would violate the integrity of the Constitution. The principle of 
constitutional integrity, along with the hierarchy of the values laid down in the Constitution, is the 
criteria of the constitutionality of amendments to the Constitution (Konstituciniai ginčai, 2019, p. 
38). Constitutional amendments have to be laid down in the respective Articles of the Constitution 
that regulate certain relations, otherwise, the systematic arrangement of constitutional provisions 
would be violated (Sinkevičius, 2015, p. 221). 
Thus, if it were decided to supplement Article 109 of the Constitution with Paragraph 5, other 
related constitutional provisions should also be amended, inter alia Article 111 of the Constitution 
should be supplemented with Paragraph 5 and Article 112(5) of the Constitution that requires for an 
independent institution of judges to participate in the selection of judges should also be amended. 
Otherwise, i.e. if only Article 48(4) were amended and Article 109 were supplemented with 
Paragraph 5, the adoption of a constitutional amendment that expands the list of entities that 
administer justice would at least temporarily (until the Seimas adopts subsequent constitutional 
amendments) cause a contradiction between constitutional provisions, thus creating conditions for 
violating constitutional values. Even if temporary, such a situation where constitutional 
amendments disturb the integrity and consistency of the Constitution, as well as the balance of 
constitutional values, cannot be justified and tolerated (Butvilavičius, 2013, p. 143). When 
considering constitutional amendments, one should not ignore the fact that corrections of 
constitutional rules or principles inevitably affect not only the body of the constitution (the text) but 
also its spirit (the essence); therefore, the content and coherence of constitutional amendments 
should be assessed both in the context of the specific provision and constitutional concept as well as 
the entirety of constitutional regulation (Butvilavičius, 2013, p. 51). 
In his comment about the amendment to Article 112(5) of the Constitution, Prof. Varga Zsolt 
András from Hungary said the following: “I have no strict position. The appropriate “place” for 
the regulation of an institution and the appropriate level of details in that regulation depends 
mostly on the constitutional custom or habit of a country (or even a more general “fashion” in a 
given era). Actually the fashion seems to prefer rather detailed regulations. However, the more 
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detailed a constitution is, the less flexibility is granted to react by simple laws to actual challenges” 
(Prof. Varga Zsolt András, Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Faculty of Law and Political 
Science, Department of Administrative Law). 
Therefore, in order to ensure the stability and certainty of the legal system, a regulatory 
mechanism that does not result in legal uncertainty is required. The Constitution should also be 
modified as necessary so that its articles do not contradict each other. Constitutional amendments 
cannot go against the concept of a Constitution as a single act (rulings of the Constitutional Court 
dated 24 September 1998, 23 October 2002, 25 November 2002, 4 March 2003, 4 July 2003, 30 
September 2003, 3 December 2003, 15 April 2004, 24 January 2014 and 11 July 2014). In addition 
to this, Lithuania should align its regulation established at the constitutional and legislative levels 
with the requirements of the Convention, in this case the requirement of judicial independence 
(Article 6 of the Convention). All this leads to the fourth amendment, i.e. the supplement of Article 
112(5) of the Constitution that states the following: “A special institution of judges provided for by 
law shall advise the President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, transfer of judges, or 
their dismissal from office” and should be supplemented with the following: that it also decides on 




For EU countries that have lay participation established at the legislative (ordinary) instead of 
the highest (constitutional) level, it is not necessary to amend the Constitution. This is due to the 
differences between the countries, their systems, and mentality, methods and tradition of 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional identity. 
The findings of the study showed that the constitutional amendment is necessary for Lithuania 
because the judicial power is formed on a professional basis. As demonstrated by the opinions of 
the authors presented in the introduction of the paper, these grounds for a constitutional amendment 
were not discovered (or formulated). 
In order to introduce lay judges, a moderate (gradual) model is the most appropriate for 
Lithuania. This model would allow avoiding intervening in the Constitution. Once it succeeds, and, 
having analysed the practice of other EU countries, the most appropriate model for Lithuania is 
discovered, not only the matter of amending Article 48(4) of the Constitution and supplementing 
Article 109 with Paragraph 5, but also the matter of supplementing Article 111 of the Constitution 
with Paragraph 5 (that the appointment and dismissal, legal status and guarantees of independence 
of unprofessional judges are established by law) should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. 
Such an amendment is necessary in order to ensure the equal status of judges and lay judges. 
Supplementing Article 112(5) of the Constitution (“A special institution of judges provided for by 
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law shall advise the President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, transfer of judges, or 
their dismissal from office”) with that it also decides on the appointment and dismissal of lay judges 
or participates in the selection of lay judges is also necessary in order to avoid violating the 
Constitution and the principle of integrity thereof. In addition to this, constitutional regulation 
should be amended in a way that complies with the provisions of the Convention regarding the 
definition of an independent court and, on the basis of the new constitutional regulation, statutory 
regulation should be developed or amended, thus avoiding judgments of the ECHR concerned with 
the violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 
Having discussed the regulatory issues pertaining to the introduction of public participation 
(including the procedure for selecting lay judges), another study focused on the legal status of lay 
judges and the relationship between this status and the rights of an individual to a fair trial is 
recommended to be conducted. The analysis of these issues (as well as the research questions 
provided in this article) is aimed at discovering the most appropriate (optimal) model of introducing 
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